Advanced Microeconomic TheoryAddison-Wesley, 2001 - 543 páginas This rigorous, up-to-date text on modern microeconomic theory presents all of the core mathematics, neoclassical theory, game theory, and information economics needed to access the modern professional literature. Complex theory is patiently and carefully developed, then clearly explained and illustrated. Because even the well-prepared students profit from more math. Careful explanations, efficient theorem-proof organization, and many examples and exercises make this a uniquely effective text for advanced courses. Students will appreciate the clear writing and accessible style. *NEW! Chapter on Auction and Mechanism Design. One of the hottest areas in economics today! *NEW! Math Appendix. Even well prepared students profit from additional math training. *Thoroughly updated throughout to reflect the latest data and theories. *An easily accessible style. *Presents core mathematics, neoclassical theory, game theory, and information economics needed to access the modern professional literature. |
Contenido
TOPICS IN CONSUMER THEORY | 69 |
THEORY OF THE FIRM | 117 |
PART II | 151 |
Derechos de autor | |
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Advanced Microeconomic Theory Geoffrey Alexander Jehle,Philip J. Reny Sin vista previa disponible - 2001 |
Términos y frases comunes
a₁ allocation assumption auction Axiom behavior bidder budget balancedness bundle choice choose competitive concave concave function Consequently consider constraint consumer's consumption convex combination convex set cost function defined definition demand functions denote derivative differentiable economy Edgeworth box endowments equal example expected utility expenditure function extensive form game finite firm firm's first-order conditions Hicksian demand homogeneous of degree implies indifference curve indirect utility function information set input demand insurance company marginal cost Marshallian demand matrix maximize Nash equilibrium negative semidefinite nonnegative optimal outcome output Pareto efficient payoff player preference relation problem production function proof properties pure strategy quasiconcave risk aversion satisfies short-run Slutsky solution strictly increasing strictly positive subgame perfect subgame perfect equilibrium substitution suppose Theorem variable vector VNM utility function Walrasian equilibrium zero дхі