troops in the event of an attack, and care is taken to have it so far to the rear, that the enemy may not be able to reach it before them. The more advanced corps retires on this point, those on the right and left move towards it by flank marches, and those in rear come up like re-enforcements by forward movements. Thus the concentration is effected by the shortest routes. To facilitate the movements, and when the cantonments are to be occupied some time, the roads are repaired, new ones even are made through forests and marshes, bridges are thrown over intervening streams, dikes are formed across ravines, &c.: no trouble or labor should be spared which contributes to the safety of the army.

The cantonments occupied during winter are called winter quarters. They differ from those just referred to only in being of greater extent. Natural obstacles should be taken advantage of to cover and secure them from incursions of the enemy. They are ordinarily established behind a river, which may serve as a line of defence.

We here conclude what we have to say on the subject of strategy with the remark, that if the principles of this elevated branch of the art of war are so simple that any one may not only understand, but discuss them, their application in practice is very difficult, and requires much sagacity and tact. The problem to be solved is an indeterminate one, admitting of many solutions; a thousand circumstances complicate

it; the data are often, indeed always, more or less uncertain; and in many cases action must be taken upon no other basis than conjecture. There are many exceptions to the guiding rules. Events succeeding each other rapidly; unforeseen occurrences; difficulties in procuring information; motives unperceived by the mass of people, but imperiously influencing a commander, oblige him to modify plans perfectly arranged. If we add that time, a most essential element, almost always fails, it will be understood that none but superior men are capable of putting in practice this science, whose principles are contained in so small a compass. Let us, therefore, abstain from judging unfortunate generals with too much severity. Let us recollect that at the moment when they were obliged to act, they were not accurately informed, either of the force or the position of the enemy; that, having no certain information on this subject, they were necessarily reduced to a weighing of probabilities; that of many things which became perfectly well known after the event, they were entirely and necessarily ignorant; that, if they had known them, they would, doubtless, have seen as well as we what was best to be done; that, perhaps, again, the force of circumstances, which is irresistible in war, has obliged them to act otherwise. Let us, therefore, be moderate in judging others. Let us be indulgent, or rather just, towards those who are, in all probability, competent to be our teachers; let us not forget that

circumstances beyond their control may have induced those acts which seem to us faults, and that good fortune is often at the bottom of the most glorious results.

CHAPTER II.

ORGANIZATION, ETC.

Art. I.—Composition of an Army.

To form an army, something more is requisite than a mere assemblage of men with arms in their hands; those men must be obedient to the orders of a commander, who directs their movements, and causes them all to act for the attainment of a common object. Without this, an army is little more than a tumultuous mob, where confusion and disorder reign supreme. If the numerous individuals composing it do not obey a single will, and do not act for a common object, no plan can be certainly undertaken or carried out. Discipline is, therefore, of prime importance to an army; an essential, indispensable condition for its existence. Thus those troops which have been brought to the highest state of discipline have at all periods, and among all races, had the undoubted superiority. By their admirable discipline, the Romans triumphed over all nations, and gained the mastery of the world.

Honor is the most certain promoter of discipline, especially in the militia. Punishments which are too severe irritate the soldier without reforming; they should be reserved for rare cases, where, to arrest mutinous disorder, it becomes necessary to use the

most powerful repressive measures. It is by using persuasive means with soldiers inclined to be regardless of duty; by treating them humanely, even when punishing; by carefully avoiding humiliating them, by contemptuous and offensive language; by seeking, on the contrary, to inspire them with sentiments of patriotism and honor, that a chief can expect to form cohorts which will be magnanimous in victory and unshaken in the midst of reverses. These are the only means which can be relied upon to produce soldiers who may be trusted in critical moments. If they are insufficient to make heroes; if enthusiasm alone is the mainspring of prodigies of valor, like that at Thermopyla, we may be at least sure of obtaining every thing that can be expected from veteran and well-organized troops.

A commander should, therefore, never use harsh and contemptuous language; he should particularly avoid violent reproofs of those subordinates who have failed in their duties; he is not excusable for giving way to passionate expressions; he will always congratulate himself for restraining his tongue; the soldiers, who are perfectly able to appreciate the offence, will give him credit for his moderation, and will pass their own judgment on the guilty parties, and will be themselves more disposed to obedience.

But there is another extreme into which officers of militia easily fall, and it must be carefully avoided. It is that excessive familiarity which lowers and