Opinion of the Court-Sawyer, C. J. [November, doubtedly one of the disabilities already existing recognized by the statute, such as those mentioned in the statute of limitations affecting the capacity to sue of a person having a present right of action existing in himself, and which excuses him from bringing the action. It cannot mean the want of a present cause of action. If there is no present right of action in a party, he has no occasion for a present capacity, an ability, to sue, or, for an excuse for not suing. The administrator being invested with the right of action to recover land of the estate, if he neglects to sue too long the action is barred, and as he represents the creditors and heirs for this purpose, it has often been decided that when an action is barred as to him, it is barred as to the heir, even though the heir be at the time a minor, or resting under some other disability. (Darnall v. Adams, 13 B. Mon. 278-9; Couch's Heirs v. Couch's Administrators, 9 Id. 161-2; Rosson v. Anderson, Id. 425; Williams v. Otey, 8 Humph. 569; Woodbridge v. Planter's Bank, 1 Sneed. 297; Worthy v. Johnson, 10 Geo. 358; Long v. Cason, 4 Rich. Eq. 60; Wych v. East India Co., 3 P. Will. 309; Pentland v. Stokes, 2 Ball & B. 74; Smilie v. Biffle, 2 Barr. 52.) Several of these are cases of administrators, and others of other trustees, where the cestui que trust was held to be barred when the trustee was barred. It is difficult to see how upon principle it should be otherwise. The moment an adverse possession by a wrong doer, of lands belonging to an estate in course of administration commences, a cause of action arises to recover it; but the policy of the law vests it exclusively in the administrator, and there it remains until the lands are lawfully sold and conveyed for purposes of administration, or are distributed to the heir. In the former case the right of action passes to the purchaser; in the latter to the heir. It is the same cause of action, and it exists in but one party at the same time. If the cause of action is barred before the sale and conveyance to the purchaser, or the distribution to the heir, there is none left to pass to either, and neither ever acquires any valid cause of action at all. If the authorities cited are not all wrong, the difficulty with the plaintiff is, not that he was laboring under a disability to sue upon an existing 1874.] Opinion of the Court--Sawyer, C. J. cause of action in his favor, but that he never became vested with a living cause of action. The cause of action became barred, and the title vested in the adverse possessor under the special statute of limitations before it came to him. Statutes of limitations are now regarded as statutes of repose, and not mere penalties for neglect, and are intended for the benefit of those who have purchased and occupied lands in good faith, believing they acquired a good title; and the policy of the law seems to have been, to shorten the time within which rights acquired in good faith under the sanction of judicial proceedings in Probate Courts can be disturbed. Whether as effective as desirable or not, the heirs are not without a remedy. They have a remedy against the administrator and upon the administrators' bond; and they may, in a proper proceeding, also compel the administrator to sue. (Smilie v. Biffle, 2 Barr, 52-4; Tyler v. Houghton, 25 Cal. 29.) Besides, it is not apparent in this case why the partial distribution could not have been made as well within three years, as more than thirteen years after the sale, and thus have enabled the distributees to sue. There must have been gross negligence on the part of the heirs in not compelling the several administrators to account, and in not applying for a distribution. Ample funds appear to have come to the hands of the administrator to pay all claims against the estate as early as 1855. If the heirs are not bound when the bar has attached as against the administrator, the administration, by the non-action of the heirs, might be kept open indefinitely, and the right of action prolonged for a century at their option. The defendants entered under their conveyances in 1856. If, as claimed by plaintiff, the whole proceedings were void, a right of action accrued in favor of the administrator to recover possession immediately; and it was barred as to him. at the end of three years, or in February, 1859. The partial distribution to plaintiff was not made till November, 1869, more than ten years after the bar of the statute attached as against the administrator. If the cause of action is not barred as to the heirs and the plaintiff, their successor in interest, then, we have this curious condition of things. Opinion of the Court-Sawyer, C. J. [November, For upwards of ten years the defendants were wrongfully in possession of the land, and yet there was no right of action in favor of anybody to recover. The administrator could not recover because he was barred. The heirs could not recover because the law vested the right of action exclusively in the administrator. The heirs would at length. acquire the land, while it would cease to be assets of the estate, and the creditors be cut off. Why should the creditors, who, under the statute, have the first lien upon the estate, be barred by the neglect of the administrator, while the heirs, whose interest is subordinate, are not? The language of the statute is express, that "no action shall be maintained by any heir or other person claiming under the deceased testator or intestate, unless it be commenced within three years next after the sale." The heir is named in terms. The plaintiff's counsel insists that under our statute the heir occupies a position similar to a remainderman; that the remainderman is not barred by the neglect of the holder of the preceding estate to sue until his right is lost, and that for similar reasons, the heir is not barred by the failure of the administrator to sue. The decisions relating to remaindermen seem to depend upon the particular language of the various statutes under which they arose, and to vary with the language. But whatever the rule may be with respect to remaindermen, I do not think their position is like that of the heir under our statute. The owner of the particular estate and the remaindermen do not represent the same estate. There is no connection whatever between them, except that one estate begins where the other shall end. The intermediate owner is in no respect the trustee or representative of the remainderman. But the administrator is a trustee of the heir and the creditor. He represents the heir and the creditor in the administration. As we have seen, a judgment in a suit to which the administrator is a party, and in which the title to the estate is determined, binds the heir. This must be because he represents the heir. I put the decision upon the statute, and upon this principle as sustained by the authorities. The 1 1874.] Opinion of the Court-Sawyer, C. J. same statute which vests the right to the exclusive possession of the real estate, and the exclusive right of action to recover it from a disseisor pending administration, and which confers the power to sell and convey title to the real estate under the authority and direction of the Probate Court, also prescribes the time within which an action must be brought by the heir or any other party claiming under the deceased, to recover the land from a purchaser in possession under a sale improperly made. It also prescribes the exceptions to the general rule laid down, and the court is not authorized upon the idea that other cases are within the equity, though not within the letter of the statute, to interpolate other exceptions than those expressed in the statute itself. (McIver v. Ragan, 2 Wheat. 28; Tynan v. Walker, 35 Cal. 643.) Sections 258 and 259, providing for a final distribution to the parties entitled, and providing that each party to whom a specific portion is allotted, "shall have the right to demand and recover their respective shares from the executor, administrator, or any person having the same in possession," in no respect limits the provisions of section 190, as claimed by plaintiff. These sections only apply to property belonging to the estate at the time of distribution. Of course, there can be no title created by the act of distribution. Nothing can be given to the distributee but that which remains in possession or custody of the administrator, as a portion of the estate. Property lawfully sold by the administrator and conveyed by valid conveyance, ceases to be a portion of the estate; and the fact that the court should assume to distribute such property to the heir would not revest a title in the distributee. The adverse possession for the time prescribed vests a perfect title in the possessor as against the former holder of the title and all the world. (Arrington v. Liscom, 34 Cal. 380-7; Cannon v. Stockman, 36 Cal. 541; Lamb v. Davenport, 1 Saw. 621; Winthrop v. Benson, 31 Maine, 384; Leffingwell v. Warren, 2 Black, 605, and cases therein cited.) Suppose an action upon a promissory note or other demand or to recover a piece of personal property belonging to the estate had become barred under the general statute of limitations by neglect of the administrator to sue, would it be claimed that a subsequent distribution of the dead cause of action to the heir, would give it new life and enable him to recover on it? I think no such claim would be made. Yet sections 258 and 259 would as clearly apply to such cause of action as to real estate, the title to which has been vested in an adverse possessor under the section in question. I see no way of escape from the conclusion that plaintiff's action is barred under section 190 of the probate act. There must be a judgment for defendants with costs, and it is so ordered. IN RE C. B. COMSTOCK & Co. DISTRICT COURT, DISTRICT OF Oregon. 1. FOREIGN CORPORATION, Acts of, when VOID.—A statute of Oregon provides that "a foreign corporation before doing business in the State, must duly execute" a power of attorney, appointing an agent upon whom all process may be served in suits against such corporation: Held, that such a corporation before complying with said act, had no power to contract or sue in the State, and that the act was prohibitory and anything done by the corporation contrary to it, was illegal and void. 2. ESTOPPEL IN PAIS.—The doctrine of estoppel in pais does not extend so far as to enable a person or corporation to do in effect what is forbidden by law, or what they are otherwise incapable of doing, and therefore a party to a contract with a foreign corporation made in violation of the above mentioned act, is not estopped to show its illegality for the purpose of preventing a recovery upon it. Before DEADY, District Judge. Objection to proof of debt.-On September 20, 1874, the Bank of British Columbia filed an amended proof of debt against the estate of C. B. Comstock & Co., for the sum of $6,620.88. On September 26, the assignee filed an objection to such amended proof to the effect that such bank was a foreign corporation, and had never complied with |