is made in good faith." How can the court be satisfied that the requisite amount and number have petitioned, when by the sworn statement of their agent and attorney it appears that they have not? In cases where the allegation as to the amount and number of the petitioning creditors is denied by the debtor, the court is required by the act to order him forthwith to file a full list of his creditors, with their places of residence and the sums due them respectively. But surely the debtor ought not to be compelled to make such an exposure of the state of his affairs when it appears from the sworn statements of the petitioning creditors on file in the cause that the requisite amount and number have not petitioned. The exception is sustained, but the creditors are entitled to ten days' further time, within which other creditors may join. This opinion has extended to a far greater length than I had purposed, or than was perhaps to be desired. The case might have been disposed of on the last point alone. But the other questions considered were elaborately argued by eminent counsel, and they are liable to arise in other cases. The occasion seemed, therefore, a fit one to consider and set them at rest so far as the decision of this court can have that effect. JAMES GILLESPIE V. JAMES H. CUMMINGS. CIRCUIT COURT, DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA. 1. PATENTS-MULTIFARIOUSNESS.-Where two separate patents for improvements in the manufacture of brooms owned by the complainant are alleged to have been infringed by the defendant, and the broom manufactured by the defendant appears to be an infringement of both patents, the bill is not bad for multifariousness. 2. SAME. Where the right to both patents alleged to be infringed for the State of California, has been assigned to complainant, the bill is not bad for multifariousness, because the assignment of one of the patents also embraces other territory than the State of California. Before SAWYER, Circuit Judge. Opinion of the Court-Sawyer, C. J. [December, J. V. O'Brien, for complainant. Tully R. Wise, for defendant. SAWYER, Circuit Judge. This is a suit in equity to restrain the infringement of two certain patents for improvements in the manufacture of brooms, one dated May 10, 1870, issued to William S. Hancock, and the other dated August 2, 1870, issued to James H. Anderson, the right to one of which for the Pacific Coast, and to the other for the State of California, have been assigned to complainants. Defendant demurs for multifariousness: Firstly, on the ground that the infringement of each patent is a separate and distinct cause of action and that the two cannot be joined in the same bill. Secondly, that the assignment of the patent right to the two patents is not for the same territory. Although it might be more directly and specifically alleged, I think it sufficiently appears that the same broom made by the defendant, if an infringement at all, must be an infringement of both patents. There is, therefore, a common point to be litigated, and much of the testimony must, from the nature of things, be applicable to both patents. So, also, the assignment of both patents embraces the State of California. Whatever the rule might be, if the several assignments covered no part of the same territory, these assignments do cover the State of California. I think the bill not bad for multifariousness on either ground. The principles laid down in Nourse v. Allen, 3 Fisher's Pat. Cases, 63, and Central Pac. R. R. Co. v. Dyer et al., 1 Sawyer, 641, appear to me applicable. Demurrer overruled, with leave to answer upon the usual terms. 1874.] Opinion of the Court-Sawyer, C. J. ANNA R. BIDWELL V. THE CONNECTICUT MUTUAL CIRCUIT COURT, DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA. PLEADING-LIFE INSURANCE POLICY.-Where, by the express terms of the policy, "the proposals, answers and declarations" made by the applicant are made a part of the policy, they should be stated in the complaint in an action founded upon the policy. Before SAWYER, Circuit Judge. Beatty & Denson, for plaintiff. Doyle & Barber, for defendant. SAWYER, Circuit Judge. Action upon a life insurance policy. The complaint contains a copy of the policy, but does not set out, either in hæc verba or in substance, the "proposals, answers and declarations" made by the applicant upon which the policy was issued. The policy set out contains the following clause: "And it is also understood and agreed to be the true intent and meaning hereof, that if the proposals, answers and declarations made by the said Alanson C. Bidwell, and bearing date the fifteenth day of November, 1866, and which are hereby made part and parcel of this policy as fully as if herein recited, and upon the faith of which this agreement is made, shall be found in any respect untrue, then and in such case this policy shall be null and void." The defendant demurs, on the ground that the complaint is uncertain and insufficient, it appearing upon its face that the entire contract is not set out. I think this point well taken. It is well settled that under the vision of the policy cited, the proposals, etc., are not mere representations made as inducement to enter into a contract, but are warranties and a part of the contract itself. (Miles v. Conn. M. L. Ins. Co., 3 Gray, 580; 1 Big. 173; Ryan v. World Mut. Life Ins. Co., 4 Ins. Law Jour., 37; Campbell v. N. E. Mut. Ins. Co., 98 Mass. 381; Tibbitt's v. Home Mut. pro Ins. Co., 1 Allen, 305; McLoon v. Conn. Mut. Ins. Co., 100 Mass, 472; Kelsey v. Mon. Life Ins. Co., 35 Conn. 235; Miller v. Mut. Ben. L. Ins. Co., 31 Iowa, 227; Lycoming Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sailor, 16 Pa. 108; Rogers v. Charter Oak Life Ins. Co., Mss. Sup. Ct., Conn.) The application being a part of the contract, it is necessary to set it out in the complaint, otherwise it does not appear what the contract is. (Bobbitt v. The L. & L. & G. Ins. Co., 66 N. C. 70; 8 Am. R. 494; Steph. Pl. 132; Gould's Pl. Ch., IV, Sec. 28; 1 Ch. Pl. 236.) The demurrer must be sustained, and it is so ordered. UNITED STATES v. JOSEPH W. HASKINS. DISTRICT COURT, DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA. 1. REMOVAL of an Offender under SECTION THIRTY-THREE OF THE JUDICIARY ACT.-An offender, after indictment found in one district, may, under that section, be arrested in any other district, and committed and removed, or bailed, as the case may be, for trial in the district where the indictment was found. 2. IDEM.-A duly authenticated copy of the indictment is sufficient evidence, if uncontradicted, to justify the commitment of the offender, and a warrant for his removal if bail is not given. 3. IDEM REMOVAL TO A TERRITORY.-For an offense against the United States committed in an organized Territory, the offender may be arrested in any district of the United States, and removed to the Territory for trial, if the territorial courts have cognizance of the offense. 4. IDEM.-Territorial courts are "courts of the United States," as that designation is applied in section thirty-three of the Judiciary Act. Before HILLYER, District Judge. Proceeding for the removal of an offender from one district to another for trial. Section 33 of the Judiciary Act enacts: "That for any crime or offense against the United States, the offender may, by any justice or judge of the United States or by any justice of the peace or other magistrate of any of the United States where he may be found agreeably to the usual mode of process against offenders in such state, and at the expense of the United States, be arrested, and imprisoned or bailed as the case may be, for trial before such court of the United States as by this act has cognizance of the offense. And copies of the process shall be returned as speedily as may be into the clerk's office of such court, together with the recognizances of the witnesses for their appearance to testify in the case; which recognizances the magistrate before whom the examination shall be may require on pain of imprisonment. And if such commitment of the offender, or the witnesses shall be in a district other than that in which the offense is to be tried, it shall be the duty of the judge of that district where the delinquent is imprisoned, seasonably to issue, and of the marshal of the same district to execute a warrant for the removal of the offender, and the witnesses, or either of them, as the case may be, to the district in which the trial is to be had. In the corresponding section of the Revised Statutes, section 1014, the phraseology is changed in some respects. In the first clause instead of saying the offender may be arrested for trial before such court of the United States "as by this act has cognizance of the offense," the language now is "as by law has cognizance of the offense." Section 9 of the organic act of Utah establishes district courts for the territory, and enacts: "And each of the said district courts shall have and exercise the same jurisdiction in all cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States as is vested in the circuit and district courts of the United States." And section 16 provides as follows: "The Constitution and laws of the United States are hereby extended over and declared to be in force in said territory of Utah, so far as the same, or any provision thereof, may be applicable." (9 St. at Large, p. 453.) "The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury; and such trial shall be held in the State where the said crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the trial shall be at such place or places |